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 Even Republics Must Sometimes Strike Back 
Jeremy Rabkin   
The general was frustrated.  In the summer of 2011, General 
James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, put his 
concerns this way in a congressional hearing: “If it’s O.K. to attack 
me, and I’m not going to do anything other than improve my defenses 
every time you attack me, it’s very difficult to come up with a deter-
rent strategy.”1  He happened to be speaking about dealing with cyber 
attacks, but he could have made a similar point about a wide range of 
security threats.  Our reticence about retaliating in kind for cyber at-
tacks seems to reflect wider uneasiness about using force in a retalia-
tory – or punitive – spirit.2 
Yet some forms of military retaliation may be quite necessary to 
our national security.  Whatever else one might say in assessing 
America’s military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq in the past 
decade, the experience demonstrates the limits of American commit-
ment to nation-building and on-the-ground policing.  But the United 
States still faces threats from many sources.  It cannot hope to recon-
struct every country that has hostile intentions.  Instead, it must find 
ways to punish countries that sponsor attacks on America or allow 
their own territory to be used for planning and launching attacks.   
As the first section of this article explains, there are plausible le-
gal grounds for inhibitions, given widely accepted understandings of 
                                                                                                                           
  Professor of Law at George Mason University School of Law. Before joining George 
Mason University, he was a Professor of Government at Cornell University for 27 years.  Profes-
sor Rabkin is a renowned scholar in international law and was recently confirmed by the U.S. 
Senate as a member of the Board of Directors of the United States Institute of Peace.  He holds 
a Ph.D. from the Department of Government at Harvard University and graduated Summa 
Cum Laude with a B.A. from Cornell University. 
 1 Thom Shanker & Elizabeth Bumiller, Hackers Gained Access to Sensitive Military 
Files, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2011, at A6. 
 2 Certainly, hesitations about cyber retaliation reflect broad legal concerns.  See Stewart 
Baker, Denial of Service: Lawyers Are Crippling America’s Ability to Defend Against 
Cyberwar with Arcane Rules and Regulations, but War Waits for No Man, FOREIGN POLICY, 
Sept. 30, 2011, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/30/denial of ser-
vice?page=full.  
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the U.N. Charter and Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.3  But as 
the next section argues, the notion that force is only justified in self-
defense – and in the narrowest understanding of self-defense – is at 
odds with the traditional view of the law of war.  It is quite clearly at 
odds with the view embraced by the American Founders and subse-
quent American statesmen.  The third section argues that limiting 
force to self-defense (in the narrowest sense) does not even comport 
with the implications of the U.N. Charter and the actual practice of 
nations since 1945.  The concluding section argues that embracing the 
logic of retaliation does not require abandoning all humanitarian or 
legal constraints on the use of force, any more than domestic criminal 
justice must disavow retribution because it has curtailed capital pun-
ishment and repudiated “cruel and unusual punishment.”4   
THE RESTRICTIVE VIEW OF LAWFUL FORCE 
Commentaries on the law of war have, for many centuries, distin-
guished jus ad bellum (the law on resort to war) from jus in bello (law 
governing the conduct of military operations, once war has begun).5  
By separating these two sets of standards, commentators could insist 
that even a state fighting for a just cause (under jus ad bellum) was 
bound to observe proper restraints in its military tactics, even if the 
enemy had no just grounds for fighting.  In recent decades, many 
commentators have come to see the U.N. Charter as imposing very 
severe limits on permissible resort to force.  That view of jus ad bel-
lum has encouraged an even more restrictive view of permissible tac-
tics in the conduct of military actions.   
The U.N. Charter obligates members to “settle their internation-
al disputes by peaceful means”6 and to “refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
                                                                                                                           
 3 U.N. Charter; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. 
 4 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting “cruel and unusual punishment”).  United 
States’ Supreme Court rulings applying this restriction to capital sentences include Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (prohibiting automatic applications of the death penalty for 
specified offenses); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (prohibiting death penalty for rape 
conviction); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (prohibiting death penalty for defendants of 
subnormal intelligence); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting death penalty for 
defendants under age eighteen).   
 5 Geoffrey Parker, Early Modern Europe, in THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON 
WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 42-51 (Michael Howard et al. eds., 1994). 
 6 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3. 
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or political independence of any state.”7  The Charter gives broad 
powers of coercion to the Security Council,8 and for the most part, 
seems to give priority to the Council in deciding how armed forces 
should be deployed.  If the Council has not called for wider measures, 
member states are limited to the exercise of the “inherent right of . . . 
self-defense if an armed attack occurs.”9  
One of the most prominent commentaries on the Charter inter-
prets this authorization quite narrowly: “[l]awful self-defense is re-
stricted to the repulse of an armed attack and must not entail retalia-
tory or punitive action . . . the means employed for the defence have 
to be strictly necessary for repelling the attack.”10  A more recent 
commentary draws out the implication for the scale of the response: 
“it is the repulsing of the attack giving rise to the right that is the crite-
rion against which the response is measured.”11  What is not necessary 
to repel an attack is, on this reading, an excessive use of force, hence 
prohibited by the Charter.    
If the focus is on “repulsing” or “repelling” a specific attack, then 
it might seem to follow that the only permissible response is one that 
focuses all counter-force on the actual attackers.  That is the view tak-
en by the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”).12  It 
emphasizes the restriction set out in Article 48 of the 1977 Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions (“Protocol I”): participants in 
international conflicts must “at all times distinguish between the civil-
ian population and combatants and between civilian objects and mili-
tary objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only 
against military objectives.”13    
                                                                                                                           
 7 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 8 See U.N. Charter art. 39–50.  
 9 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 10 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:  A COMMENTARY 677 (Bruno Simma et al. 
eds., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter CHARTER COMMENTARY].  The senior editor and contributor to 
this commentary, the German legal scholar Bruno Simma, was elected in 1996 to the U.N. Inter-
national Law Commission (an advisory body, elected by the U.N. General Assembly), then 
elected a Justice of the International Court of Justice in 2002 – which indicates, at least, that the 
commentary was not seen as propounding unacceptably extreme doctrine by most U.N. member 
states.   
 11 JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 
156 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). 
 12 See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 (Yves Sandoz 
et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY]. 
 13 Protocol I, supra note 3, at art. 48. 
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The United States and a range of other states have declined to 
ratify Protocol I.14  Still, the ICRC insists that this provision simply 
codifies the basic premise of the law of armed conflict.  In its 1987 
commentary on Protocol I, the ICRC insists that “the basic rule of 
protection and distinction,” as laid down in Article 48, summarizes a 
long-standing principle which is, in fact, “the foundation on which the 
codification of the laws and customs of war rests,” tracing the first 
efforts at codification to the mid-nineteenth century and implying that 
the “custom” is very much older.15  The claim is developed in Custom-
ary International Humanitarian Law, sponsored by the ICRC and 
published in 2005.16  According to this study, there is now a universal 
rule limiting the conduct of war: “[t]he parties to the conflict must at 
all times distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives.  
Attacks may only be directed against military objectives.  Attacks 
must not be directed against civilian objects.”17   
The ICRC Study elaborates the rule with this constraining defini-
tion of permissible “military” targets: “military objectives are limited 
to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make 
an effective contribution to military action and whose partial or total 
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at 
the time, offers a definite military advantage.”18  All sites or assets that 
do not fit that definition must be classified as “civilian objects,” which 
may not be the target of an attack.19  And according to the ICRC, this 
limitation is so fundamental that it has become obligatory.  States can 
                                                                                                                           
 14 Other states that have not ratified include Israel, Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Indone-
sia.  See Protocol I, supra note 3.  
 15 ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at 598.  The earliest source cited in support of this 
claim is the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, which stipulated that “the only legitimate object 
which States should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the 
enemy.”  Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Certain Explosive Projectiles, 
Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297 [hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration].  But as the 
ICRC COMMENTARY acknowledges, this admonition was “concerned with preventing superflu-
ous injury or unnecessary suffering to combatants” – the St. Petersburg Declaration sought to 
prohibit use of explosive bullets against soldiers in battle – “and was not aimed at specifically 
protecting the civilian population.”  The ICRC COMMENTARY then claims that later treaties, 
such as the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
“deemed” the complete protection of civilian objects “to be generally accepted as a rule of law, 
though at that time it was not considered necessary to formulate it word for word.”  In fact, the 
ICRC COMMENTARY cites no earlier source that directly and explicitly enunciates the sweeping 
principle announced in Article 48 of Protocol I.  
 16 Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, ICRC, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 25 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) [hereinafter ICRC STUDY].  
 17 Id.  
 18 Id. at 29.  
 19 Id. at 32 (“Civilian objects are all objects that are not military objectives.”).  
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no longer embrace general principles of restraint.  They must accept 
all of these particular inferences from the general principles, without 
possibility of reservation or exception.20   
The ICRC’s narrow view of permissible targets follows quite log-
ically from the restrictive reading of the U.N. Charter.  Aside from 
other objections to the ICRC’s admonitions,21 it rests for this reason 
on a very questionable approach to self-defense.  On the restrictive 
reading of the U.N. Charter, a state has no lawful recourse against 
violent incursions, even those that inflict significant civilian casualties, 
if the attacker does not actually seize and hold territory in the victim 
state.  Suppose a hostile state sponsors terrorist attacks or launches 
missile attacks on another state.  On the most restrictive reading of 
the Charter, the victim state must accept the casualties and the ensu-
ing insecurity among its own people, as the necessary price for adher-
ing to international law.22    
The same reasoning implies that even a massive conventional at-
tack, such as the Japanese strike on the United States’ fleet at Pearl 
Harbor in 1941, provides no right to respond if the attackers withdraw 
from the territory of the victim state.  Even if the initial attack violat-
ed international law, that initial violation gives the victim state no 
claim to respond militarily.  The initial aggressor thus gets to choose 
the timing of the initial attack and, if that runs into trouble, the initial 
aggressor then gets to choose the best moment to call a halt – re-
                                                                                                                           
 20 Article 51 of Protocol I includes a prohibition on “[a]ttacks against the civilian popula-
tion or civilians by way of reprisals.”  Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51, para. 6.  Article 52 in-
cludes a separate prohibition of “reprisals” against “civilian objects.”  Protocol I, supra note 3, 
art. 52, para. 1.  The 1987 ICRC COMMENTARY insists that the prohibition of reprisals against 
civilians (or civilian objects) is “not subject to conditions and it therefore has a peremptory 
character [i.e., supersedes all other legal claims]; in particular it leaves out the possibility of 
derogating from this rule by invoking military necessity.”  See ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 
12, para. 1984, at 626.  
 21 The U.S. government has questioned the “methodology” of the ICRC STUDY, which 
assumes that mere statements by government officials are an adequate guide to state practice.  
John B. Bellinger III & William J. Haynes II, A U.S. Government Response to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross Study, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89 INT’L REV. 
RED CROSS 443, 445 (2007). 
 22 The CHARTER COMMENTARY acknowledges that  
a State is bound to endure acts of force that do not reach the intensity of an armed attack, 
thus remaining devoid of any effective protection until the [Security Council] has taken 
remedial measures. . . . [I]t cannot be overlooked that, being caught in the ‘dilemma be-
tween security and justice’, the U.N. Charter deliberately gives preference to the former. 
See CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 792.  In other words, even when retaliation 
might serve “justice,” states will find “security” from waiting for the Security Council to do 
“justice” on their behalf. 
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grouping its forces, as it may prove, only while awaiting a more oppor-
tune occasion for renewing the attack.   
Other commentators urge a more accommodating view of the 
U.N. Charter.   They hold that when an attack seems imminent, a tar-
geted state may undertake preemptive measures, denying the immi-
nent aggressor the advantage of choosing the most advantageous 
moment to launch its attack.23  The same logic might allow a would-be 
victim to continue fighting, even when an enemy has withdrawn or 
never actually invaded the territory of the would-be victim.  By such 
reasoning, the United States has claimed that it is lawful to strike ter-
rorist bases to disrupt the capacity of terrorists to carry out future 
strikes.24 
Even this more accommodating view of the Charter, however, 
does not answer the underlying challenge, so long as it remains entan-
gled with the ICRC’s restrictions on the conduct of military opera-
tions.  If the defending state is limited to attacking “military targets,” 
it bears the burden of identifying and then isolating the bases from 
which terrorists or other irregular forces may be operating.  Terrorists 
and guerrillas do not always keep to fixed bases.  When they do, they 
may deliberately situate themselves amongst “civilian objects,” so that 
they cannot be attacked without violating the Protocol I rule against 
attacks “which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects . . . which would be ex-
cessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage antic-
ipated.”25  
In the ICRC view, it does not matter that terrorists aim to kill ci-
vilians in their own attacks.  The restriction must still apply to states 
seeking to defend their civilian population from terrorist attacks.  The 
International Court of Justice has still gone further, interpreting the 
Charter as prohibiting even strikes aimed solely at terrorist bases, if 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See also D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187-92 (1958); JULIUS 
STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF UNITED NATIONS THEORIES OF 
AGGRESSION 44 (Univ. of California Press, 1958). 
 24 Harold H. Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, The Obama Administration and 
International Law, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International 
Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm. 
 25 See Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51, para. 5; see also ICRC STUDY, supra note 16 at 29 
(stating that this restriction in Protocol I has now become binding on all states as a matter of 
customary international law).  
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the bases are in another country and the host state does not exert di-
rect control over the terrorist forces.26  
On such readings, we remain in a situation where the rules seem 
to confer major advantages on the aggressor, even the most lawless 
aggressor.  Forces that are most contemptuous of legal restraints get 
the benefit of rules that, in practice, would only constrain victim states 
that do care about international legality.   
Such perverse consequences do not prove that the ICRC view is 
wrong.  They certainly do not prevent the ICRC view from being tak-
en seriously.  From a certain point of view, it may still seem appropri-
ate to insist on such encompassing humanitarian constraints, even 
when it appears likely that the rules will only constrain one side.  One 
can see the logic of such restrictive views if one looks at domestic 
analogies.   
Criminal law allows for personal self-defense, but only as a last 
resort.  The traditional common law rule requires that, before resort-
ing to force, a threatened individual must exhaust the opportunity to 
avoid confrontation by “retreat.”27  We do not allow private victims to 
shoot at attackers already in flight because that may jeopardize the 
safety of bystanders.  So, it can be argued that states have the obliga-
tion to avoid confrontation.  If states allow themselves to pursue po-
tential threats, they will risk more conflict and more harm to civilians.  
On the international plane, as in domestic settings, the right to self-
defense must be constrained, one can argue, by the rights of third par-
ties not to be dragged into violent confrontations.   
However, in domestic settings, victims may hope that municipal 
police will eventually catch those who attacked them.  The analogy 
would hold among states if the U.N. Security Council could be relied 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, para. 139, at 62 (July 9).  
Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence 
in the case of armed attack by one State against another State.   However, Israel does not 
claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State [but from terrorist organi-
zations] . . . . Consequently, the Court concludes that Article 51 of the Charter has no rele-
vance in this case. 
Id. 
 27 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b) (1962).  
The use of deadly force is not justifiable . . . unless the actor believes that such force is nec-
essary to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual inter-
course compelled by force or threat; nor is it justifiable if . . . (ii) the actor knows that he 
can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating . . . except 
that: (A) the actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or place of work . . .  
Id.  
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upon to supply corrective force to constrain international aggressors.  
That reliance, of course, is wildly counter-factual.  In the real world, 
the Security Council is generally paralyzed by differences among its 
five permanent members, any one of whom may veto a proposed re-
sponse by the Council.28  In over sixty years since its establishment, 
the Council has only given clear, direct authorization for military re-
taliation on three occasions – despite hundreds of disputes in which 
states resorted to force on their own.29    
One might still argue that states have a moral duty to act as-if the 
Council were capable of providing collective measures of security be-
cause the duty of restraint is not a contingent duty from which states 
can be readily released.  Even this argument might draw some support 
from the domestic analogy.  The citizens’ duty to rely on police and 
courts to punish offenders does not hinge on anything like certainty 
that they will do so in any particular case.30  Citizens, in effect, have a 
civic obligation to give public authorities the benefit of their doubts.  
For the greater good of the community, private citizens are required 
to refrain from “taking the law into their own hands” through private 
retaliation.31   
This moral appeal presumes, however, that the world is at least in 
the process of developing international controls on dangerous and 
lawless action, including such provocations as terrorism.  If that pre-
sumption is taken away, it is unlikely that bystanders would be better 
off if states with the power to punish such provocations, or punish 
those states that abet and host them, always refuse to do so.  A world 
without “private enforcement” of international standards would be a 
world where standards were not enforced.  If powerful states adhere 
to the supposed moral imperative of restraint and that makes the 
world worse off, should their restraint still be seen as moral?  Perhaps 
it is dereliction of duty.  What makes the restrictive view of the U.N. 
Charter all the more suspect is that it is not, in fact, the traditional 
                                                                                                                           
 28 Michael J. Glennon, Platonism, Adaptivism, and Illusion in U.N. Reform, 6 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 613 (2006).  
 29 Id.  Reports’ estimates of the number of international armed conflicts between 1945 and 
1989 alone vary from two hundred to nearly seven hundred.  The wide variation reflects the 
disagreement about when a limited exercise of force justifies the term “conflict.”  Id.  
 30 “[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect 
the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.”  DeShaney v. 
Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). 
 31 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(b).  “The use of deadly force is not justifiable [in 
effecting arrest] unless . . . (iii) the actor believes that the force employed creates no substantial 
risk of injury to innocent persons . . . .”  Id.  
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view – even the traditional view of legal writers insisting on the obli-
gation of natural law constraints in international affairs.   
RECOGNITION OF PUNITIVE WAR BEFORE THE U.N. CHARTER 
The view of war associated with the U.N. Charter has much ap-
peal – at least on the surface – that it is often regarded as the culmi-
nating stage in centuries of development toward a more humane 
world.  Ancient wars, as we read of them in the Bible or in the writ-
ings of Greek and Roman historians, were often fought to the total 
destruction of the enemy – all adult males slaughtered, all the women 
and children carried into slavery.32  Medieval Crusaders still justified 
such wars of annihilation in the name of religion.33  The Enlighten-
ment recoiled from such barbarism.  Our current view of war, as many 
suppose, is simply the final blossoming of our modern humanitarian 
outlook.   
It is certainly true that statesmen and treatise writers condemned 
“aggression” for many centuries before the advent of the U.N. Char-
ter.  Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars, invoking earlier exam-
ples, describes “aggression” as the only crime that states can commit 
toward each other – without attributing that claim to the U.N. Char-
ter.34 
Still, the view of war now so often attributed to the U.N. Charter 
does not, in fact, reflect long-established understandings.  While they 
condemned “aggression,” statesmen and treatise writers in earlier 
times took for granted that invasion was not the only “cause” that 
might justify an armed response.  Classic treatises distinguished “of-
fensive” from “defensive” wars, based on which side struck the first 
blow.  Not every “offensive war” was considered “aggression,” how-
ever.35  The side which first resorted to military action might well have 
had legitimate grievances, justifying recourse to a military response.    
                                                                                                                           
 32 Robert Stacey, The Age of Chivalry, in THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 5, at 27-28.  
 33 Id.  
 34 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH 
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 51 (1977) (citing examples from the 1930s and nineteenth century, 
and from nineteenth century legal commentaries). 
 35 See JEAN-JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW 
468 (P. Korkman ed., T. Nugent trans., Liberty Fund 2006).   
We must therefore affirm, in general, that the first who takes up arms, whether justly or un-
justly, commences an offensive war; and he who opposes him, whether with or without a 
reason, begins a defensive war.  Those who look upon the word offensive war to be an odi-
ous term, as always implying something unjust; and who, on the contrary, consider a defen-
sive war as inseparable from equity, confound ideas, and perplex a thing, which of itself 
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To cite an example that is still familiar to graduates of American 
high schools: the United States declared war on Britain in 1812 in re-
sponse to British interference with American commerce on the high 
seas and the impressment of American sailors (seized on the high 
seas) into the British Navy.36  America’s ensuing war measures pro-
voked a British invasion of American territory, but that was a conse-
quence, not a cause, of the United States resorting to war. 
As late as 1919, the Covenant of the League of Nations required 
members to submit their disputes to League efforts at mediation and, 
when possible, to international arbitration.  The League Covenant did 
not, however, simply prohibit first resort to force.37  That would have 
seemed to be asking too much in a world where it was understood that 
nations had rights, which they were entitled to defend.38  To reduce all 
                                                                                                                           
seems to be sufficiently clear.  It is with princes as with private persons.  The plaintiff who 
commences a suit at law, is sometimes in the wrong, and sometimes in the right.  It is the 
same with the defendant. 
 36 1 BRADFORD PERKINS, THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN 
RELATIONS: THE CREATION OF A REPUBLICAN EMPIRE 1776-1865, at 137-140 (W. Cohen ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1993). 
 37 Under Article 12, the Members of the League “agree” that in  
any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration . . . 
or to enquiry by the [League’s] Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until 
three months after the award by the arbitrators . . . or the report by the Council.  
League of Nations Covenant art. 12.  Under Article 13, the Members agree “that they . . . will 
not resort to war against a Member . . . which complies” with an arbitration award.  Id. at art. 13.  
But “[i]n the event of any failure to carry out such an award . . . , the Council shall propose what 
steps should be taken to give effect thereto.”(emphasis added).  Id.  Under Article 15,  
If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the Members 
thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute,  the 
Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall 
consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.  
Id. at art. 15.  In other words, members reserved the right to resort to force when their just 
claims could not be resolved by arbitration or by efforts of the League or where such resolutions 
were not fully implemented.   
 38 Nearly a decade after the negotiation of the League of Nations Covenant, most mem-
bers of the League agreed (outside the framework of the League) to the General Treaty for the 
Renunciation of War, popularly known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact.  General Treaty for Renun-
ciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.  
Signatories agreed that “the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature 
or of whatever origin . . . shall never be sought except by pacific means.”  Id. at art. II.  The 
agreement would have been entirely redundant if the Covenant of the League already prohibit-
ed resort to force in “all disputes or conflicts.”  The treaty said nothing about a right to self-
defense – because the original negotiators (the U.S. Secretary of State and the French Foreign 
Minister) could not agree on a definition of the circumstances in which “self-defense” would still 
be appropriate.  But no one seems to have imagined that by signing this pact, a state was giving 
up all rights to defend itself.  Hence, Nuremberg prosecutors charged Nazi leaders with “con-
spiracy to commit aggression” in violation of the pre-war Kellogg-Briand Pact, but no one sug-
gested that Poland or France were equally guilty for resisting German invasions.  The Pact was 
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just causes of war to repelling all-out invasion would be equivalent to 
reducing all claims for police intervention to cases of armed assault.  
But in the domestic setting, of course, a whole range of injuries to 
property, reputation, or peaceful order are thought to justify police 
intervention and subsequent punishment under the criminal law.     
Can we think of international military action as in some way 
equivalent to police intervention in domestic affairs?  Or is that anal-
ogy already too punitive?  Perhaps the first thing to notice is that even 
in relatively modern times, wars frequently ended with territorial con-
cessions.  Again, to cite familiar American examples: the United 
States made peace with Mexico in 1848, only after Mexico ceded vast 
territories in what is today the American Southwest.  In 1899, the 
United States made peace with Spain, only after the latter ceded 
Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the United States.  Ger-
many and Japan were forced to cede territory in the aftermath of 
World War II.    
Before 1945, it was considered – at least by many writers – the 
natural result of just war that losers would provide some compensa-
tion to victors.39  Apart from territorial concessions, the losers might 
have to provide financial restitution.  It made sense since wars typical-
ly began as diplomatic disputes – in which one side (at least) claimed 
to have been wronged by the other, and accordingly demanded some 
form of satisfaction for the wrong done.  Disputes commonly were 
settled by payment of money or some other acknowledgment.  War 
                                                                                                                           
not even considered a firm barrier to using force against unlawful German measures as the 
remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 or the annexation of Austria in 1938 (both contrary to 
the Versailles Peace agreement), so there was serious policy debate in London and Paris on how 
to respond.  Churchill’s postwar account, emphasizing the failure of will in London and Paris, 
says not a word about legal concerns.  WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE GATHERING STORM 192-
99, 272-76 (1948). 
 39 See STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY 210-
214 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (emphasizing prevailing view in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries that victors were entitled to wide discretion in imposing peace terms); see also 
II LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 66, at 76-77 (1912). 
No moral or legal duty exists for a belligerent to stop the war when his opponent is ready to 
concede the object for which war was [initially] made. . . . The risk the belligerents run, the 
exertion they make, the blood and wealth they sacrifice, the reputation they gain or lose 
through the changing fortune and chances of war – all these and many other factors work 
or may work together to influence the ends of a war so that eventually there is scarcely any 
longer a relation between them and the causes of the war. . . . and the [existing] rules of In-
ternational Law by no means forbid such alteration or modification of the ends of a war. . . . 
[I]t could not be otherwise, and there is no moral, legal, or political reason why it should be 
otherwise. 
Id.   
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could reasonably be seen as the last resort in a process analogous to 
litigation – with the aim of enforcing damage claims.   
In some cases, the underlying grievance was an affront to the 
honor of the victim state, as seen through insults to its flag or its rep-
resentatives in another country.40  A military attack – as by shelling 
from naval guns, often directed at non-military installations, such as 
government buildings – was regarded as a suitable “remedy” in itself.41  
The point was to extract some “price” for the injury received, so the 
offending state would refrain from inflicting such injuries in the fu-
ture.42   
It hardly needs saying that powerful states might abuse their 
claimed rights of retaliation in such circumstances, but this view of the 
rights of war was not invented by great powers in the nineteenth cen-
tury.  It was already expounded upon by natural law theorists in the 
seventeenth century, by thinkers regarded as “modern” or at least 
“early-modern.”  Such writers did not hesitate to use the language of 
“punishment” in relation to war measures.    
Take, for notable example, the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, often 
considered the “father of the modern law of nations.”  His great trea-
tise, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (“The Law of War and Peace”) includes a 
long chapter on the just causes of war, along with a long chapter on 
unjust causes of war.43  Among the just causes of war, according to 
Grotius, is punishment.  Grotius also offers a catalog of sins for which 
                                                                                                                           
 40 See E.S. COLBERT, RETALIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 68-69 (1948).  The Royal 
Navy bombarded a Brazilian port in 1861, after Brazilian authorities had arrested a British naval 
officer and his crew and then refused to apologize for the offense.  Further, the United States 
occupied Vera Cruz in 1914 to retaliate for the arrest of American sailors by Mexican authori-
ties.  Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 If this seems extreme, we should think about attacks on embassies in recent times.  
When the revolutionary government of Iran allowed American diplomats in Tehran to be held 
hostage, the Carter administration approved a military raid to rescue these hostages – which had 
to be aborted when helicopters crashed en route.  Would it have been obviously wrong to 
threaten – or to implement – cruise missile strikes against Iranian targets to make the Iranian 
government pay a price for continuing to hold the hostages?  If the hostages had been released 
after ten months, without agreeing to any further arbitration, would it have been wrong to im-
pose some penalty on Iran for the injury of the prolonged occupation of the embassy?  Did the 
actual “settlement” encourage the new Iranian regime to think it could sponsor further terror 
measures with relative impunity?  
 43 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS [ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE] ch. 20 
(James Brown Scott ed., Frank Kelsey trans., Clarendon Press 1925) (“On Punishment”); see 
also id. at ch. 21 (“On Sharing of Punishments”) (justifying retaliation on whole communities for 
decisions of their rulers).   
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guilty states may rightfully be punished by any sovereign strong 
enough to administer the just deserts.44  
John Locke's Second Treatise, following the account offered by 
Grotius decades earlier, holds that the right to punish is not even lim-
ited to victims: in the state of nature, “every man . . . may bring such 
evil on any one, who hath transgressed that [L]aw [of Nature] as may 
make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his 
example others, from doing the like mischief.”45  This power is re-
tained by government, acting toward outsiders, since “the whole 
community is one body in the state of nature, in respect of all other 
states or persons out of its community.”46  
The most influential eighteenth century treatise on the law of na-
tions, written by the Swiss diplomat Emer de Vattel, follows Locke 
closely in its background assumptions and also in its acceptance that 
war can sometimes be punitive.  According to Vattel, “it is lawful to 
take away the property of an unjust enemy . . . to weaken him or to 
punish him,” and “the same reasons authorize a belligerent in destroy-
ing what he can not conveniently carry off,” justifying in some circum-
stance even the commander who “lays waste to a country and destroys 
food and provender in order that the enemy may not be able to sub-
sist there . . . .”47  Vattel endorses “retaliation” in kind, when an ene-
my has refused quarter to surrendering troops,48 and even approves 
punitive measures against another state to extract “reparation” for 
“attacks [on] its honor . . . .”49 
The American Founders took these doctrines to heart.  The Fed-
eral Constitution, aiming to establish a national government with ex-
                                                                                                                           
 44 Id. 
 45 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 313 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1960) (1690) (emphasis added). 
 46 Id. at 411.  (emphasis added).  The immediate following sentence explains, as an exam-
ple, that “controversies that happen between any Man of the Society with those that are out of 
it, are managed by the public; and an injury done to a Member of their Body, engages the whole 
[Society] in the reparation of it.”  Id.  Locke does not say such “reparation” must be financial, 
rather than punitive.   
 47 E. DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE, 
APPLIQUÉS À LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS [THE LAW 
OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE 
AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS] 292, 293 (Charles Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. 1916) 
(1758) [hereinafter THE LAW OF NATIONS]. 
 48 Id. at 280-81. 
 49 Id. at 79.  Vattel took the trouble to address the objection that “honor” was not a suffi-
ciently serious injury to justify retaliatory action.  A nation’s honor, he explains, is its reputation, 
which is part of its strength.  The reputation for not accepting insult and injury meekly might still 
be relevant to a nation’s strength and security.   
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clusive authority over foreign relations, does seek to constrain the 
war-making powers of the states.  Article I, Section 10 denies states of 
the Union the power to “keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of 
Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign Pow-
er, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent 
Danger as will not admit of delay.”  The Federal Government, by con-
trast, is expressly accorded the power to commit the United States to 
alliances; it can offer guarantees to foreign nations through an open-
ended power to make treaties, which might commit the country to war 
without, itself, being attacked.  Congress has the power to “raise and 
support armies” and to “provide and maintain a Navy[,]” without re-
striction to time of peace.50  And where states can “engage” only in 
defensive wars, Congress has an open-ended power to “declare war.”51     
The Philadelphia Convention chose the term “declare war” – in-
stead of the original proposed phrase “make war,” to acknowledge 
that the President might be justified in responding to an attack with-
out a declaration of war.52  As Alexander Hamilton later explained, 
“when a foreign nation declares [war] . . . openly and avowedly makes 
war upon the United States, [that nation and America] are then by the 
very fact, already at war, and any declaration on the part of Congress 
is nugatory; it is at least unnecessary.”53  The “plain meaning” of the 
clause giving power to Congress to “declare war,” Hamilton ex-
plained, is that “it is the peculiar and exclusive province of Congress, 
when 
the nation is at peace, to change that state into a state of war; wheth- 
er from calculations of policy or from provocations or injuries re-
ceived . . . .”54 
Did the Framers understand “war” as having a punitive compo-
nent?  Andrew Kent has argued in compelling detail that the clause 
giving Congress the “power to define and punish offenses against the 
law of nations” was understood, at the time of the Founding, to pro-
vide authority to punish nations, not just individuals.55  The Framers 
were certainly familiar with standard treatises of that era, according to 
                                                                                                                           
 50 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-13. 
 51 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 52 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318-19 (Max Farrand ed., 
rev. ed. 1937). 
 53 Alexander Hamilton, The Examination Number 1 (Dec. 17, 1801), in 25 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 455-56 (H.C. Syrett ed., 1977).   
 54 Id. 
 55 J. Andrew Kent, Congress’s Under-Appreciated Power to Define and Punish Offenses 
Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEX. L. REV. 843 (2007). 
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which one nation had the right to punish another for infringement of 
its own rights. 
The Constitution, itself, provides for military measures of a puni-
tive nature.  Separate from the power to “declare war,” Congress has 
the authority to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal.”56  These “let-
ters” were granted to private persons (usually ship captains), authoriz-
ing them to seize property from an enemy state.  No one supposed 
that such “privateers” would concentrate their attacks on enemy war-
ships or military installations.  Privateers rarely had the firepower to 
take on foreign navies or armed formations.  The idea was to raid the 
commerce of the enemy – that is, civilian shipping – as a way of im-
posing harm.57  One appeal of the practice was that it was thought of 
as an alternative to all-out war and the clash of armies.  Letters of 
marque were thus issued to American privateers in the 1790s, author-
izing attacks on French merchant shipping in retaliation for French 
attacks on American shipping.  But there was no declaration of war 
and such punitive measures proved sufficient to win French promises 
of acceptable future conduct.58   Whereas letters of marque authorized 
the seizure of enemy goods, letters of reprisal authorized sheer de-
struction, even on land.59  
Even in war between fellow Americans, the United States gov-
ernment did not subscribe to the view that “war” must avoid harm to 
civilians.  One can see the point from the manual on the law of war 
issued to the Union Army in the American Civil War, often known as 
the “Lieber Code,” after its principal draftsman, the German émigré 
scholar, Francis Lieber.60  The code approved “all destruction of prop-
erty, and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, or 
communication . . . .”61  So far from emphasizing any sharp distinction 
                                                                                                                           
 56 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 57 Nicholas Parrillo, The De-Privatization of American Warfare: How the U.S. Govern-
ment Used, Regulated, and Ultimately Abandoned Privateering in the Nineteenth Century, 19 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2007).  
 58 ALEXANDER DE CONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE 
UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 1797-1801, at 124-130 (1966). 
 59 Grover Clark, The English Practice With Regard to Reprisals by Private Persons, 27 
AM. J. INT’L L.  694 (1933). 
 60 General Orders, No. 100, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United 
States in the Field, Adjutant General’s Office, Washington, April 24, 1863, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp [hereinafter General Orders].  On the origins 
of the code, see RICHARD S. HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 45-71 (1983).  
On its larger context in the intensifying struggle during the Civil War, see MARK GRIMSLEY, 
THE HARD HAND OF WAR: UNION MILITARY POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN CIVILIANS 1861-
1865, at 145-51 (1995) (emphasis added).  
 61 General Orders, supra note 60, art. 15. 
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between military personnel and “civilians” – a term it does not use – 
the Lieber code urged commanders to “throw the burden of war . . . 
on the disloyal citizens,” while seeking to protect the “manifestly loyal 
citizens”62 and held it “lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, armed 
or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy.”63  
Not only the blockade of southern ports, but also General Sherman’s 
devastation of civilian agriculture in his march through Georgia in 
1864 (along with the contemporaneous devastation of farms in the 
Shenandoah Valley by General Sheridan) were treated as consistent 
with the code.64  So, too, was the Emancipation Proclamation, freeing 
slaves in those states, or portions of states, that would not submit to 
Union authority.65  As the code explains, “Public war is a state of 
armed hostility between sovereign nations . . . whose constituents 
bear, enjoy, suffer, advance and retrograde together, in peace and in 
war.”66  
Military tactics in the world wars were even less mindful of civil-
ian claims, particularly with regard to property.  “Enemy property” – 
civilian as well as government-owned – was seized by Allied govern-
ments when present in their own countries.67  Allied naval blockades 
                                                                                                                           
 62 Lieber, supra note 60, at art. 156.  
 63 Lieber, supra note 60, at art. 17. 
 64 STEPHEN C. NEFF, JUSTICE IN BLUE AND GRAY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL 
WAR 92-101 (2010) (emphasizing that both Sheridan and Sherman tried to maximize damage to 
property while trying to minimize direct loss of life to civilians). 
 65 Lincoln’s Cabinet was well aware of the objection raised by former Supreme Court 
Justice Benjamin Curtis that the emancipation took property not only from those who actively 
supported the southern rebellion but also from those who might have sought to remain loyal to 
the Union.  BENJAMIN CURTIS, EXECUTIVE POWER (1862), reprinted in 1 UNION PAMPHLETS 
OF THE CIVIL WAR 497 (Frank Freidel ed., Harvard University Press 1967).  For the most recent 
survey of the legal issues involved in the emancipation, see STEPHEN C. NEFF, JUSTICE IN BLUE 
AND GRAY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR 128-49 (2010).  
 66 Lieber, supra note 60, at art. 20. 
 67 1 CHARLES C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED 
BY THE UNITED STATES 537 (1922) (“The general right of confiscation is incidental to that 
broader right of a belligerent to endeavor to weaken the enemy by striking at its economic as 
well as purely military resources, and that irrespective of their actual availability to either con-
testant in the prosecution of the war.”); 2 CHARLES C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY 
AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 236 (1922).  As Hyde points out, Ger-
man property confiscated by Allied powers was not returned to German owners, even after the 
First World War, because the Treaty of Versailles prohibited attempts at recovery.  Id. at 523-24.  
There was no compensation to either Germany or Japan for World War II property seizures, 
either.  For Supreme Court endorsement of these practices, see Steehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 
(1921); Central Trust v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921); United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 
U.S. 1 (1926); Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469 (1947); Cities Service Co. v. 
McGrath, 342 U.S. 330 (1952); Handelsbureau La Mola v. Kennedy, 370 U.S. 940 (1962) (Black, 
J., dissenting).  
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enforced prohibitions against trade with enemy states by seizing car-
goes destined for Germany or Japan as “contraband” (when it was not 
simply sunk by military action).  It was called “economic warfare” – 
the effort to weaken the enemy’s entire economy.  Though the scope 
of blockade measures far exceeded all earlier limits, distinguished 
jurists acknowledged the collapse of earlier standards as an accom-
modation to new strategic realities.68  
In the Second World War, bombing was extended from military 
bases and weapon depots to the factories producing military supplies 
and then to the residential areas where factory workers and others 
supporting the war effort might live.69  At war’s end, the Nuremberg 
Tribunals declined to punish German commanders either for subma-
rine attacks on merchant shipping or for bombing of “civilian” areas, 
as these practices had become standard war tactics for all sides in the 
Second World War.70 
COERCIVE FORCE AFTER THE U.N. CHARTER 
Did the U.N. Charter really put an end to previous understand-
ings?  The text of the Charter, itself, indicates the contrary.  The final 
text of the Charter was settled at a conference in San Francisco in 
June of 1945, only a few weeks after Germany’s surrender, at a time 
when fierce battles were still continuing against Japan.  The Charter 
takes for granted that international relations would still be governed 
by many of the concerns and tactics pursued during and before the 
Second World War.    
To start with, the Charter authorizes the Security Council to im-
pose enforcement “measures” not only on a state which has commit-
                                                                                                                           
 68 See Hersh Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 360-82 (1952).   
If the practice followed by both sides to the conflict is evidence of the legal position, then 
the traditional law on the subject, derived as it was from the notion of a legally relevant dis-
tinction between military and civilian needs, no longer exists. . . . In view of this there can 
be no question here of revising – or resuscitating – the law with the help of legal arguments 
drawn from the obsolete armoury of the past.  The possibility must be envisaged that total 
war has irrevocably removed the foundations of a substantial part of this branch of the law 
and that juristic – or even political – efforts to give them a new lease of life may be in vain.   
Id. at 374-75.  Lauterpacht was subsequently appointed to the International Court of Justice.  
Neither the Additional Protocols of 1977 nor any subsequent treaty has clarified whether any 
elements of pre-World War I law on naval blockade have survived the contrary practices of the 
world wars.  
 69 MICHAEL BURLEIGH, MORAL COMBAT 484-501 (2011). 
 70 TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 325-27, 399-409 
(1992). 
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ted “aggression,” but also on a state regarded as having committed a 
“breach of the peace” or a mere “threat to the peace.”71  The Charter 
contemplates substantial retaliation, not only for “armed invasion,” 
but for threats or injuries falling much short of that.  Prominent 
statesmen in 1945 lamented that the German invasions of 1939-41 had 
been preceded by unlawful and intimidating measures, which had not 
been resisted at the time because they had not quite risen to the level 
of contested invasions.72  Now, the Security Council would be author-
ized to provide collective security with retaliatory “measures” that 
would “include complete or partial interruption of economic relations 
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of 
communication . . . .”73  
The Charter describes these sanctions as “measures not involving 
the use of armed force” – that is, measures imposed prior to full-scale 
military conflict.74  But these are measures which the target state 
would be expected to resist, as targets of such measures had common-
ly done in the past.  How, for example, could the enforcing states as-
sure a “complete interruption of economic relations” with the target 
state, unless they had some capacity to blockade the target state by 
sea?  How could these states ensure “complete interruption” of “eco-
nomic relations” by air or rail, without some means to disrupt rail 
links or shut down air traffic?  Unless one presumes something like 
total obedience to resolutions of the Security Council by all nations in 
the world without further coercion – in other words, a world of total 
conformity to law as mere law – these measures “not involving the use 
of armed force” seem to imply the existence of coercive force in the 
background.  
The Charter, thus, envisions the possibility of escalating from the 
initial blockade “measures” to such “actions by air, sea, or land forces 
as may be necessary. . .”75  Nothing in the Charter indicates that such 
“actions” must be aimed exclusively at “military objectives.”  A sub-
sequent provision specifies that, when there is need for “urgent mili-
tary measures,” the Council may call upon “air force contingents” for 
                                                                                                                           
 71 U.N. Charter art. 39.  
 72 PAGE WILSON, AGGRESSION, CRIME AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 72-4 (2009). 
 73 U.N. Charter art. 41. 
 74 Surveys of the deliberations at San Francisco regarding article 41, report no concern 
that excessive sanctions might be improper or implicitly constrained by the Charter.  LELAND M. 
GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 311-
14 (3d rev. ed. 1969). 
 75 U.N. Charter art. 42. 
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“international enforcement action,”76 again without any indication 
that such “action” must be aimed exclusively at “military objectives” 
and never at “civilian objects.”  If one thinks of these measures as 
enforcement of economic sanctions, they would logically be aimed at 
the channels of “economic relations,” disrupting civilian infrastructure 
more effectively than prior resolutions “not involving the use of 
armed force.”  If one thinks of “actions by air, sea or land forces” as 
something like war, one would expect the war to be carried on by the 
means most recently deployed by Allied powers against Germany and 
still being actively deployed against Japan when the Charter was ne-
gotiated.77  Every nation that participated in the San Francisco Con-
ference in 1945 had, by then, endorsed the Allied war effort.78   
One may argue that the framers of the Charter presumed – or at 
least hoped – that in future conflicts, such measures would only be 
wielded by the Security Council (or pursuant to resolutions of the 
Council).  But where did the Council get the authority to wield such 
measures if not by delegation from the member states?  And if the 
Council is generally paralyzed by disputes among the permanent 
members, any one of whom can block a Council resolution by unilat-
eral exercise of its veto power, do states have no authority to resume 
the full range of powers associated with the “inherent right of [self-
defence]”? 79 
Prominent commentators and some governments have accepted 
the idea that the Charter’s limitations do not apply to humanitarian 
intervention because the claim to rescue threatened civilian popula-
tions cannot be held hostage to divisions on the Security Council.80  
Some reasoning of this sort – expanding the Charter’s actual language 
to accommodate “felt necessities” – must be assumed by those who 
                                                                                                                           
 76 U.N. Charter art. 45. 
 77 The drafting conference for the U.N. Charter convened on April 25 and concluded on 
June 26, 1945.  Germany surrendered on May 8, 1945 and Japan on September 2, 1945.  Article 
107 of the Charter specified that none of its provisions would affect continuing war measures 
against “any State which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to 
the present Charter.”  See U.N. Charter art. 107. 
 78 To be eligible to attend – that is, to receive an invitation from the American organizers 
of the conference – a state had to have declared war against either Germany or Japan prior to 
the convening of the conference in April 1945.  To be part of the “United Nations” was to be an 
ally of those engaged in these wars; the term itself had been in regular use during the war as 
alternate name for the Allies.  STEPHEN C. SCHLESINGER, ACT OF CREATION, THE FOUNDING 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 59 (2003). 
 79 See U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 80 See e.g., Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 245 (J.L. Holzgrefe & R.O. 
Keohane eds., 2003).  
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defend the legality of the NATO intervention against Serbia in 1999 
or even those who defend the scale of assistance which NATO gave to 
Libyan rebels in 2011 (stretching a Security Council resolution only 
authorizing protection for civilians, rather than offensive operations 
against the Gaddafi government).81  Nations have stronger moral 
claims to defend themselves than to defend civilians elsewhere.  Cer-
tainly, their claims to defend themselves are much older and better 
established.82  A U.N. Charter that is no longer read to bar humanitar-
ian interventions is not easily read as continuing to impose strict limits 
on the natural right of self-defense.   
There are very strong grounds to read Articles 2(3) and 2(4) as 
prohibiting states from resorting to force in many kinds of disputes 
that states once commonly did try to settle by military action.  Since 
1945, states have not resorted to force to compel delinquent states to 
honor financial obligations, even though it was common practice in 
the early twentieth century to send gun boats to enforce debt pay-
ments, even to private creditors in the enforcing state.83  However, 
Article 51 still recognizes an “inherent right to self-defense” – or as 
the French text states more broadly, droit naturelle de legitime de-
fense.84  It is a very great leap from the claim that states must re-
nounce military remedies for some kinds of injuries to the conclusion 
that they can only use force to “repel” an all-out invasion.  Once it is 
acknowledged that states can exercise the right of self-defense against 
other forms of “aggression” or “threats to peace,” it is no longer clear 
that military responses from a defending state must be confined to the 
military forces of the threatening state.  What is the relevant “military 
objective” when the aim is to stop a hostile power from supporting or 
encouraging terrorist attacks?   
In practice, actual governments do not always accept the narrow 
view of “self-defense” urged by academic commentators.  Major 
states do embrace the understanding that “defense” may include re-
taliation – not merely the disarming of opposing forces.  The clearest 
example involves so-called “belligerent reprisals” – wartime retalia-
tion for violations of the law of war.  The text of Additional Protocol I 
                                                                                                                           
 81 S.C. Res. 1972, ¶ 4-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1972 (Mar. 17, 2011).   
 82 See e.g., T.J. LAWRENCE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 127-28 (6th ed. 1910) 
(“An intervention to put a stop to barbarous and abominable cruelty . . .  is destitute of technical 
legality, but it may be morally right . . . .”). 
 83 See e.g., COLBERT, supra note 40, at 66-68. 
 84 GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING HUMANITY, WHEN FORCE 
IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY 65-71 (2008) (suggesting that the French text implies somewhat broader 
claims for intervention on behalf of others). 
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does purport to prohibit such reprisals against civilians and civilian 
objects, even when an enemy has previously and unlawfully directed 
attacks at such targets.  The ICRC study of Customary Humanitarian 
Law insists that the prohibition on such reprisals has now become 
binding on all states, even those which are not parties to Protocol I, 
through incorporation into customary law.85  Nonetheless, major states 
hold to the contrary, reserving the right to undertake reprisals in kind 
against enemies that do target civilians.  The British government, one 
of the last to ratify Protocol I, published an emphatic rejection of the 
view that such reprisals have become unlawful.86 
Surely, one might think, whatever they may say about limited re-
prisals, no civilized state is prepared to threaten mass death.  As a 
matter of fact, most western states – and a number of others – includ-
ed express reservations to Protocol I with respect to nuclear weap-
ons.87  If attacked by nuclear weapons, they reserve the right to re-
spond in kind.88  Even the International Court of Justice, in its 1996 
Advisory Opinion on the Threat to Use Nuclear Weapons, could not 
muster a majority for the view that it would always be wrong to 
threaten the use of such weapons.89  While all the Justices agreed that 
use of nuclear weapons should only be contemplated in extreme cir-
cumstances, the majority acknowledged that international law had not 
yet come to the point of prohibiting the threat to use such weapons in 
retaliation for an attack threatening the continued existence of a na-
tion. 
What is permissible in the most extreme circumstances might 
well be regarded as improper in less extreme circumstances, but the 
principle that retaliation is a lawful response might still apply.  One 
might think less terrible means of retaliation would, after all, be much 
                                                                                                                           
 85 HENCKAERTS, supra note 16. 
 86 UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 422-23 
(2004).  An accompanying commentary rejects as “unconvincing” the claim that reprisals against 
civilian objects are now prohibited.  As to “the assertion that there is a prohibition in customary 
law” against such reprisals, the manual claims such assertion “flies in the face of most of the 
state practice that exists” in this area (i.e., states do not act as if they believed there is such a 
prohibition).  Id. at 423 n.62. 
 87 Such declarations, excluding nuclear weapons from the requirements of Protocol I (or 
limiting application of Protocol I to “conventional weapons”), were filed by Canada, Italy, Ger-
many, United Kingdom, Spain, and expressed by the United States on signing.  DOCUMENTS ON 
THE LAWS OF WAR 502, 504, 506, 509-10, 512 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff, eds., 3d ed. 
2000).   
 88 Id.  
 89 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, 266 (July 8).  
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easier to justify than such horrifyingly extreme measures as attacks 
with nuclear weapons.  Some forms of retaliation could be vastly more 
limited, however, while still going beyond the mere disabling of op-
posing military forces, let alone limited solely to “repulsing” an actual 
attack in progress.   
A few governments have openly embraced the concept of peace-
time reprisals.  They claim that a practice which was generally accept-
ed before 1945 – reprisal as a lesser alternative to war – was not en-
tirely abolished by the U.N. Charter.  Israel is a preeminent example, 
claiming the right to retaliate on surrounding nations for terrorist at-
tacks on Israeli civilians, without treating such retaliation as all-out 
war.  At least some well-regarded commentators view the practice as 
entirely lawful.90    
Other nations have embraced the practice of peacetime reprisals, 
though not the terminology.  The United States struck government 
offices in Tripoli in 1987 in response – one might as well say, in retali-
ation – for Libyan involvement in a terror attack on American ser-
vicemen in Berlin.91  In justifying the American air strikes, President 
Reagan’s speech, as Gabriella Blum has pointed out, indulged freely 
in the rhetoric of moral blame associated with punishment, not merely 
the language of threat reduction associated with limited claims of self-
defense.92  In the late 1990s, the United States and Britain repeatedly 
resorted to air strikes against Iraqi targets in response to Saddam 
Hussein’s reneging on previous agreements to allow U.N. inspectors 
to monitor Iraqi military facilities.93  These strikes were endorsed by 
European leaders, though they surely savored more of punishment 
than of self-defense against some immediate threat.94   
The full-scale invasion of Iraq in 2003, toppling the government 
of Saddam Hussein for failing to adhere to conditions of the 1991 
cease-fire agreements, was highly controversial.  Still, it was supported 
by a coalition that embraced nearly one-third of U.N. Members and 
                                                                                                                           
 90 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 221-31 (4th ed. 2005). 
 91 Id. at 229. 
 92 In justifying the American air strike, President Reagan said it would “not only diminish 
Colonel Quadhafi’s capacity to export terror, it will provide him with incentives and reasons to 
alter his criminal behavior.”  See Address to the Nation on United States Airstrikes Against 
Libya, 1 PUB. PAPERS 468, 469 (Apr. 14, 1986).   
 93 Lothar Brock, The Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era: From Collective Action 
Back to Pre-Charter Self-Defense, in Michael Bothe, et al., REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY, THE 
USE OF FORCE AFTER THE COLD WAR 33-34 (2005) (criticizes the claims made at the time that 
such actions were motivated by preemptive self-defense). 
 94 Id. 
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two-fifths of the Permanent Members of the Security Council.  Even if 
one thinks the invasion was an excessive response, it does not follow 
that the proper course was to have done nothing.  The obvious alter-
native was to engage in more air strikes of the kind implemented in 
the late 1990s, that is, punitive measures rather than all-out war.   
Economic sanctions, the favored alternative to military interven-
tions, are not inherently less provocative.  Japan was provoked to de-
clare war against the United States in 1941 by an oil embargo, at a 
time when Germany refrained from declaring war, even while the 
United States’ Navy was attacking German U-Boats in the North At-
lantic.95   Withholding normal economic relations may have compara-
ble effects to imposing a blockade in war.96  Prolonged economic sanc-
tions may impose more civilian suffering than limited military inter-
ventions.97 
So, if retaliatory military strikes conflict with common interpreta-
tions of the U.N. Charter, it is not obvious that restrictive interpreta-
tions of the Charter ought to prevail.  Whatever the hopes of 1945, the 
practice of nations is not consistent with such restrictive interpreta-
tions.  As the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties acknowl-
edges, the actual practice of signatories to a treaty is relevant to inter-
preting the ongoing meaning of treaty provisions.98  The U.N. Charter 
is, in fact, a treaty, which cannot escape this sort of informal reinter-
pretation to bring it into line with prevailing practice among the signa-
tories.99   
                                                                                                                           
 95 ROBERT FERRELL, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 626-33 (1969) (reviewing claims that the 
Roosevelt administration deliberately goaded Japan into attacking).  
 96 See data on effects of United States’ sanctions, such as exclusion from United States 
banking system. 
 97 A Columbia University researcher, for example, estimated that increased child mortali-
ty rates in Iraq during the economic sanctions regime were “most likely” in the range of 227,000.  
Richard Garfield, Morbidity and Mortality Among Iraqi Children, COLUMBIA INTERNATIONAL 
AFFAIRS ONLINE 1, 34-35 (1999), available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/ 
resources/A2E2603E5DC88A4685256825005F211D-garfie17.pdf.  Most estimates of total civil-
ian casualties from the outset of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 until 2009, when major NATO 
combat roles came to an end, offer figures well below 200,000. 
 98 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 art. 31, 
para. 3 (“There shall be taken into account [in interpreting treaties] . . . (b) any subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding 
its interpretation . . . .”)  
 99 MICHAEL J. GLENNON, THE FOG OF LAW 86-87 (2010).  For an extended proposal for 
reinterpreting the Charter more permissively, in order to accommodate actual practice, see 
ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 
177-202 (1993).  But the original understanding did not necessarily exclude retaliatory strikes; 
certainly that was not clearly understood by commentators at the time.  See, e.g., Charles Fen-
wick, Intervention: Individual and Collective, 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 645, 657-58 (Oct. 1945). 
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There is all the more reason for reinterpreting Charter re-
strictions because the Charter is so difficult to amend.  The United 
States Constitution, which has a deliberately cumbersome amending 
process, has still been formally amended six times since 1945.  The 
Charter has received only one formal adjustment (raising membership 
on the Security Council from 9 to 15) despite many high-level efforts 
to revise the Charter to accommodate major changes in world politics.  
Meanwhile, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court have 
introduced authoritative changes in the understanding of the United 
States Constitution (as in abolishing racial segregation and other 
forms of discrimination and applying the Bill of Rights to the States).  
The International Court of Justice has no comparable capacity to im-
pose authoritative reinterpretations of the Charter.100  It has been par-
ticularly marginalized in dealing with provisions on national self-
defense, given the reluctance of states to submit disputes about armed 
conflict to the Court. 
The least one can say is that there remains room for debate re-
garding the legality of military retaliation.  That debate cannot be 
closed off by dogmatic invocations of pronouncements by the Interna-
tional Red Cross or an older generation of academic commentators.  
Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly and a proposed amend-
ment to the Statute of the International Criminal Court illustrate in-
ternational support for restrictive readings of Charter limitations, but 
they are not, in themselves, definitive guides to international law.101  
Something as fundamental as the right to self-defense – which the 
Charter itself recognizes as an “inherent” or “natural” right – cannot 
be bound by interpretive restrictions merely on the say-so of diplo-
mats raising their hands at international conferences.    
                                                                                                                           
 100 According to its own Statute, the ICJ decides only the case before it: “The decision of 
the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” 
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59 (June 26, 1945), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0.  
 101 The U.N. General Assembly adopted a “Declaration on Principles of International law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations” which asserts that “[s]tates have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal 
involving the use of force,” but the same Declaration asserts that, “[n]o State may use or en-
courage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in 
order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights . . . .”  G.A. Res. 
2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8082, (Oct. 24, 1970) (adopted 
without vote).  There is no reason to accept that the former prohibition has any more validity 
than the latter; slogans adopted by the acclamation in the General Assembly are not interna-
tional law.  For critical analysis of the proposed International Criminal Court amendment, defin-
ing aggression, see GLENNON, supra note 99.  
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The experience of ages is that when there is no price for aggres-
sion, there is likely to be more of it.  Restricting the range of permis-
sible responses to aggressive acts should not be a matter settled by 
implication or by merely plausible interpretations of treaties from by-
gone eras.  Where international practice remains unsettled, interna-
tional law must be recognized as uncertain, particularly when it comes 
to questions of defending against unlawful force.  There is too much at 
stake.  When an American President is urged to consider retaliatory 
strikes as necessary to protect American security, those who urge such 
measures cannot be dismissed as advocates of lawless policy.   
HUMANITARIAN CONSTRAINTS DO NOT EXCLUDE PUNITIVE 
MEASURES 
Meanwhile, something like the practice of reprisal or retaliation 
endures, even if commentators – when not condemning such practice 
– prefer to characterize them as “countermeasures.”102  Official United 
States military doctrine takes a broad view of where self-defense may 
be exercised – as in response to attacks on U.S. nationals overseas.  It 
also insists that military action may go beyond targeting an enemy’s 
military forces to reach anything that affects the enemy’s “war 
fighting capacity” which might reach a very broad range of targets 
indeed.103  American commanders have acknowledged that they con-
sider the psychological impact of targets on the civilian population in 
the hope of achieving “shock and awe” among civilians as well as op-
posing military forces,104 but there is no public acknowledgement that 
                                                                                                                           
 102 David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 831 
(2002). 
 103 The description of permissible targets appears in COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE 
LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ¶ 8.1.1., available at http://www.fichl.org/uploads/media/ 
US_Navy_Commander_s_Handbook_Annotated_Supplement_1997.pdf.  For criticism, claiming 
the United States standard goes far beyond what Protocol I or customary law would permit,  see 
Frits Karlshoven, “Noncombatant Persons: A Comment to Chapter 11 of the COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK ,” in THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 310 (Horace B. Robertson, ed., 1999). 
 104 For example, General Michael Short, speaking at the outset of NATO’s air campaign 
against Serbia in 1991, acknowledged his eagerness to target civilian morale:  
I felt that in the first night the power should have gone off and major bridges around Bel-
grade should have gone into the Danube and the water should be cut off so the next morn-
ing the leading citizens of Belgrade would have got up and asked, ‘Why are we doing this?’  
And asked [Serb President] Milosevic the same question.   
C.R. Whitney, Air Wars Won’t Stay Risk Free, General Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1999, at A1, 
available at http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA149940812&v=2.1&u=flstuniv&it= 
r&p=AONE&sw=w.  Two years later, however, General Short described this effect to “make 
the Serb population unhappy with their senior leadership because they allowed this to happen” 
as merely “a spin-off – a peripheral result – of [his] targeting a valid military objective.”  Michael 
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retaliatory strikes may have the principal aim of inflicting punishment 
on another society. 
It may not be of urgent importance to agree on terminology, but 
the resort to evasive terminology here seems to reflect inhibiting 
qualms.  It is therefore worth trying to address the most common ob-
jections to the revival of traditional views. 
Perhaps the most common objection is that, if we accept the logic 
of punitive measures, we will end up abandoning all humanitarian 
constraint.  What makes this objection seem plausible is that the aim 
of retaliation is, in fact, to inflict harm, rather than simply disable the 
opposing military force, so the ensuing harm is more likely to affect 
civilians.  That was true of economic warfare in earlier times.105  It has 
been the experience with at least some economic sanctions of more 
recent times.106  Still, it is does not at all follow that a state which em-
braces retaliatory strikes must discard all humanitarian restraint.   
To start with, retaliation might seek to limit civilian loss of life.  
Retaliatory air strikes, for example, might target buildings when they 
are least likely to be occupied or might be preceded by advance warn-
ing to civilians to evacuate the intended targets.  The state engaged in 
retaliation might also hold itself to some notion of proportionality – 
doing enough damage to make its point, but not all the damage its 
own capacities might allow it to unleash.  In other words, retaliation 
might be bound by traditional notions of discrimination and propor-
tionality, without committing to the precise limits in Protocol I, as 
interpreted by the International Red Cross. 
In debates about domestic criminal justice, many commentators 
hold that capital punishment should be abandoned, but they do not, 
                                                                                                                           
Short, Operation Allied Force from the Perspective of a NATO Air Commander, in LEGAL 
AND ETHICAL LESSONS OF NATO’S KOSOVO CAMPAIGN 29 (Andru E. Wall ed., Naval War 
College 2002). 
 105 Germany estimated some 700,000 civilian deaths from the Allied blockade of Germany 
in the First World War.  British estimates put the number at about 800,000.  ALEXANDER 
GILLESPIE, 2 A HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF WAR 73 (2011) (“The Customs and Laws of War 
with Regard to Civilians in Times of Conflict”). 
 106 U.N. agencies estimated that economic sanctions on Iraq during the 1990s caused sever-
al hundred thousand deaths.  The claim that 567,000 children had died, published in the British 
medical journal The Lancet was much disputed.  See Health Effects of Sanctions on Iraq, 346 
THE LANCET 1439 (DEC. 2, 1995).  No one disputes that children suffered disproportionately 
from the effects of the U.N. approved sanctions.  Meanwhile, sanctions on Serbia in the early 
1990’s imposed such extreme economic dislocation that average income dropped by half while 
unemployment and poverty rose to nearly half of the population.  Serbia experienced “economic 
meltdown,” but not “the humanitarian catastrophe that gripped Iraq.”  DAVID CORTRIGHT & 
GEORGE A. LOPEZ, THE SANCTIONS DECADE: ASSESSING UN STRATEGIES IN THE 1990S 46-47, 
73-74 (2000). 
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for that reason, disavow the general principle of retributive punish-
ment.  The same pattern has appeared in international criminal jus-
tice.  Advocates for the International Criminal Court insist the institu-
tion is necessary to “end impunity” for the worst violators of human 
rights – that is, to ensure punishment.107  They do not think the general 
aim of retribution – nor even the hope of effective deterrence  – is 
negated because the ICC Statute excludes capital punishment.108   
The historic view of war measures was somewhat similar.  Op-
penheim’s treatise, for example, specifically disavowed “wanton” de-
structiveness and “useless violence,” while still embracing such severe 
measures as the cutting off of food supplies to civilians.109  Contempo-
rary commentators who urge more active measures of retaliation 
make similar distinctions.  General Charles Dunlap, for example,  
has urged that the United States consider that, in military actions 
against tyrannical enemies, it might be appropriate to target civilian 
amenities, such as hotels and vacation resorts, used by the enemy 
elite.  He still urges restraints that would avoid substantial loss of life 
among civilians.110 
A more general objection is that war is fundamentally about co-
ercion, not “punishment,” and to admit the latter as a respectable mo-
tive will open the way to more extreme tactics in the spirit of venge-
ance.  In the domestic setting, it is argued, “punishment” is deter-
mined by dispassionate judges, after the accused has been afforded 
opportunity for trial; police are not supposed to “punish” suspects in 
                                                                                                                           
 107 The Preamble to the Rome Statute (establishing the International Criminal Court) 
affirms that the signatory states are, “[d]etermined to put an end to impunity for the perpetra-
tors of [the most serious] crimes.”  Preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/99_corr/ 
cstatute.htm. 
 108 See Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M. 999, 1046, art. 77 (1998). 
 109 See  2 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 187 (3d ed. 1912).  
In former times invading armies frequently used to fire and destroy all enemy property 
they could not make use of or carry away. . . .in the nineteenth century it became a univer-
sally recognized rule of International Law that all useless and wanton destruction of enemy 
property, be it public or private, is absolutely prohibited. 
Id.  On the other hand, “general devastation of a locality, be it a town or a larger part of enemy 
territory is permitted. . . . in exceptional cases,” but “it is impossible to define once and for all 
the circumstances which make a general devastation necessary . . . .”  2 OPPENHEIM’S 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 190 (2d ed. 1912).  
 110 Charles Dunlap, Jr., The End of Innocence: Rethinking Non-combatancy in the Post-
Kosovo Era, STRATEGIC REV. 9, 14-15 (2000).  Dunlap defends the proposal in a recent collec-
tion.  Charles Dunlap, Jr., International Humanitarian Law Facing New Challenges, in 
TARGETING HEARTS AND MINDS: NATIONAL WILL AND OTHER LEGITIMATE MILITARY 
OBJECTIVES IN MODERN WAR 117-26 (Wolf Heintschel von Heinegg & Volker Epping eds., 
2007). 
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the course of apprehending them.  By analogy, so the argument goes, 
an enemy still outside our custody is not a fit subject for punishment.  
Military action, like action by police, is meant to subdue an enemy.  
That is why military actions, such as air strikes, are invariably ended 
when enemy resistance ceases.  To continue them would be sheer bru-
tality.   
There is some force in these concerns, but they do not justify a 
sharp conceptual distinction between “coercion” and “punishment.”  
After all, domestic criminal justice is also about coercion.  That is why 
even convicted felons are sometimes given pardons or reprieves, be-
fore satisfying their full sentence under the law, when judged to be no 
longer dangerous.  Prosecutors sometimes accept plea bargains in 
which defendants promise to foreswear objectionable behavior, or 
provide some form of restitution, without even admitting guilt.  On 
the other side, wars are often followed by measures – like occupation 
of territory or continuing trade restrictions – that look much like pun-
ishment to the defeated side.111 
A more sophisticated or legalistic objection is that no nation has 
the power to punish another because the principle of sovereign equal-
ity prohibits one nation from sitting in judgment on another.112  One 
might respond by noting that the jurists who first propounded the doc-
trine of sovereign equality did not acknowledge this implication.  As 
noted earlier, Grotius, Vattel, and Locke – to which we might add, 
Pufendorf, Burlamaqui and others113 – did, in fact, embrace the notion 
that aggrieved nations were entitled to “punish” offending nations.    
It was Immanuel Kant, in the early nineteenth century, who em-
phasized that punishment can only be imposed by a superior and then 
drew the conclusion that, since all sovereign states are juridically 
equal, no nation can properly punish another.114  Starting from the 
same premise, however, Kant dismissed any reliance on international 
law, insisting that only an armed peace federation could ensure justice 
among nations.115  That is not a doctrine with much appeal to contem-
porary advocates for international justice.  If no nation can judge an-
                                                                                                                           
 111 In the late spring of 1919, German delegates at the Versailles Peace Conference pro-
tested that “hundred of thousands” of civilians had died as the result of the continuation of the 
Allied blockade on Germany – which prevented even imports of food and medicine – after the 
armistice of November 11.  GILLESPIE, supra note 105 at 73-74. 
 112 DAVID RODIN, WAR AND SELF-DEFENSE 175-79 (2002). 
 113 Kent, supra note 55, at 851. 
 114 Perpetual Peace, in KANT’S POLITICAL WRITINGS 102-05 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet 
trans., Cambridge 1970).  
 115 Id. at 104. 
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other, how can courts of one nation try international war criminals 
from other nations?  Well into the twentieth century, major treatises 
insisted that this was indeed improper.116  By the same reasoning, it is 
not even clear how international tribunals can undertake such trials.  
The authority of international tribunals has been delegated to them 
by sovereign states.  If sovereign states have no authority to judge 
other states, they cannot delegate such authority to an international 
institution.117 
The preference for international trials rests on the assumption 
that such trials will only punish those who are guilty.  That assumption 
may be quite optimistic.  Indictments, by putting obstacles in the path 
of compromise, may prolong conflicts with consequent harm to inno-
cent civilians.118  Even in the domestic setting, we allow corporations 
to be punished with such sanctions as treble damages and other “puni-
tive damages” though it is known in advance that innocent stockhold-
ers and employees will suffer in consequence.   
                                                                                                                           
 116 See  2 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 342-43 (3d ed. 1912).  
Violations of rules regarding warfare are war crimes only when committed without an or-
der of the belligerent government concerned.  If members of the armed forces commit vio-
lations by order of their government, they are not war criminals and may not be punished 
by the enemy; the latter may, however, resort to reprisals.  
Id.  The restriction only makes sense on the premise - still widely accepted in the context of civil 
litigation - that courts of one state may not judge the legal validity of measures adopted by an-
other state.   
 117 One can argue that the issue disappears when the home state of the accused consents to 
the jurisdiction of the international tribunal (or the national tribunal of a foreign state).  That 
argument leaves questions about cases where the Security Council has authorized the ICC to 
take jurisdiction over states that have not ratified the ICC Statute (as happened with Sudan and 
Libya) or agreed to the resolution establishing an ad hoc tribunal (as with Serbia and the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia).  The deeper question is whether a state 
can waive consent in such an open-ended way – allowing international authorities to impose 
punishment for measures, which the state itself viewed as necessary in self-defense - and still 
remain sovereign.  One can say that private individuals have consented to the exercise of crimi-
nal justice on themselves, when they consented to be part of a state with powers to enforce 
criminal justice.   That was Kant’s argument.  But the whole point of that account is that private 
individuals have consented to establish a superior over themselves, so they are no longer sover-
eign individuals.  If “consent” to the ICC Statute or the U.N. Charter has comparable signifi-
cance, the ICC or the U.N. Security Council must be viewed as organs of an international peace 
federation through membership in which states have lost their sovereignty.  That is not quite 
how defenders of these institutions commonly depict them.   
 118 For arguments that the ICC has prolonged conflict in Uganda (where the government 
failed to disarm the Lord’s Resistance Army with an amnesty offer, after the ICC refused to 
accept it) and Sudan (where the President, after indictment by the ICC, expelled most NGO 
observers and participants in conflict resolution efforts), see DAVID HOILE, THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: EUROPE’S GUANTANAMO BAY? 30, 32, 191 (2011). 
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Still, punitive military measures do risk more severe harm to the 
innocent.  The point is serious.  It is certainly grounds for postponing 
and constraining punitive measures.  But it is not, in itself, a compel-
ling basis for disavowing all resort to retaliatory measures.  In the first 
place, it is true of all military action that it can harm innocent by-
standers.  The possibility that harm will go beyond its intended targets 
is not usually considered a decisive objection to war measures.  
Retaliation aimed at civilians or civilian objects may seem to 
raise objections that do not apply (or apply as fully) to attacks on mili-
tary targets, because in the latter case, the harm to civilians is unin-
tended even if frequently quite foreseeable.   In the Red Cross view of 
the world, civilians are inherently innocent, hence always to be pro-
tected against intentional targeting.  But is it so that civilians are al-
ways innocent?  To insist that only the actual perpetrators of wrongful 
actions are guilty is to reduce whole populations beneath the level of 
human agency, to regard them as so many cogs in a mechanism di-
rected by others.  That is not how earlier writers viewed this question.   
The very term “civilian”, in the sense of non-military, did not come 
into general use until the nineteenth century.119  Classic treatises on 
the law of nations assumed that whole populations might share, at 
least in some degree, the guilt for policies of their rulers.  After all, a 
government could not commit aggression if its own people did not 
provide at least passive support by accepting its governing authority.  
One can argue that civilians, particularly in a dictatorship, cannot 
easily change their government, but it is even more true that soldiers 
under military command cannot easily question the strategy and tac-
tics laid down by their superiors.  It is still thought proper to attack 
military units to force armies to change their stances – to withdraw, to 
                                                                                                                           
 119 Though earlier usages (with very different meanings) can be traced to late medieval 
times, the Oxford English Dictionary reports the first use of “civilian” – in this sense of not-
military – in 1794 and subsequent examples from decades later.  OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY ONLINE (Oxford University Press 2012), 
http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.fiu.edu/view/Entry/33577 (last accessed Aug. 13, 2012) (noting that 
in 1794 a “civilian” was “not a regular soldier”).  The first use of such derivative terms as “civil-
ian casualty” and “civilian target” did not, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, appear 
until the early twentieth century.  Id.  The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions on the Law and 
Custom of War use the term “civilian” only once – in a provision stipulating that “civilian” mes-
sengers for military communications should, if captured, receive the same treatment as military 
prisoners.  First Peace Conference of The Hague, 1899, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: 
TREATIES & DOCUMENTS, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/ 
FULL/150?OpenDocument; Second Peace Conference of The Hague, 1907, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW: TREATIES & DOCUMENTS, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/195? 
OpenDocument. 
2011] Even Republics Must Sometimes Strike Back 117 
 
retreat, ultimately to stop fighting.  It is common practice in war to 
encourage soldiers on the opposing side to desert, appealing to the 
individual choice of line soldiers, even though they are under military 
discipline.   If those soldiers do not surrender or desert, they face con-
tinuing (and often lethal) attacks from the opposing forces.  In a simi-
lar way, a determined enemy may appeal to civilians to rise against 
their own government.    
After years of pressure on civilians, through economic warfare, 
Germans did take to the streets and force the overthrow of the Kai-
ser’s government before the end of the First World War.120  The fol-
lowing generation of Germans continued to obey a far more evil gov-
ernment, down to the bitter end.  It was, arguably, quite just that they 
bore the cost of that support in ruined cities.  Certainly, the destruc-
tion of German cities achieved one of the classic aims of corrective 
justice – suppressing the nation’s appetite for such crimes by hammer-
ing home the catastrophic costs of aggressive war.   
It remains true that retaliatory measures may prove counter-
productive, hardening the resolve of the targeted population, rather 
than undermining their support for the existing government and its 
policies.  That is also true, however, of military measures approved by 
the Red Cross, such as direct attacks on an opposing army.   Offen-
sives often fail and end up weakening the attackers more than the 
defenders, as proved true in so many tragic Allied offensives in the 
First World War and in many offensive campaigns of the Union Army 
in the American Civil War.   Commanders in war must pay close at-
tention to their particular circumstances.  What one has a legal right 
to do is not necessarily the right thing to do in every situation.  Groti-
us devoted a whole chapter of his treatise to emphasizing the point.121  
It may be true in some cases that an attack on civilian infrastructure 
will weaken civilian support for reckless measures by the government 
(or by a terror network hosted by surrounding civilians).   
After all the arguments and counterarguments, retaliatory 
measures will be, at best, a very rough sort of justice.  That is reason 
for caution and constraint in exercising retaliation.  It is not sufficient 
reason for denying a right to retaliate.  It may be, in fact, that the right 
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to retaliate will be exercised with more caution, precisely because it is 
associated with the risks of military action.   
One can see the point by looking at the International Criminal 
Court, which acts on the initiative of a prosecutor who is not account-
able to any government and has no formal authority to temper prose-
cution policy in relation to adverse policy consequences.  Questioned 
about the possibility that his attempt to prosecute the Sudanese Head 
of State would prolong war in Sudan, Prosecutor Luis Moreno-
Ocampo explained that his responsibility was “judicial” – that is, sole-
ly to the law: “I have no political responsibility,” he insisted.122  A gov-
ernment which launches retaliatory military strikes cannot pretend 
that its decision follows simply from “law.”  It cannot disclaim any 
regard for consequences.  An actual government, particularly in a 
democratic state, will always be required to answer more questions 
than an international civil servant.  That is no reason to disarm gov-
ernments when they need to answer injury and threat with retaliatory 
force.   
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no troops of its own – will always do better to enforce “legal limits” is hard to understand.   
